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Chapter, J 2
Reforming Social Security?
Edward M. Gramlich

Like many other public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, the United States
Social Security system is running into long-run financial difficulties.
Workers are now living long past their retirement age, fertility rates are
below the zero-population-growth level; and long-term rates of real wage
growth are at a historically low level. These difficulties are reflected in
the recent Report of the Social Security Trustees (1996) that implied
that significant austerity measures will be necessary to restore long-run
balance in the system. Moreover, cohort rates of return on payroll contributions are declining to levels well below going real interest rates for
young people. Polls indicate that increasing numbers of young people
do not trust that Social Security benefits will be there for their own retirement (Friedland 1994).
As with other PAYG systems, Social Security and disability benefits are
paid by trust funds that have time-related schedules (i.e., future benefit
liabilities can be predicted from present tax payments). Every year the
Trustees of the system (the Commissioner of Social Security, three cabinet members, and two outside members) report on the long-run actuarial soundness of the system, and every four years an outside Advisory
Council (such as the one 1 chaired from 1994 to 96) is established to
review the methods and assumptions of the Trustees as well as to suggest new policy departures. These bodies have developed the tradition
of requiring the system to be in "close actuarial balance" over a 75-year
period, though it would make perfect sense to go to an even longer planning horizon. In 1994 the Congress passed new legislation to make the
Social Security Administration an independent agency, and one of the
provisions of this legislation would create a permanent advisory body
that will presumably develop its own long-term actuarial conventions.
In their 1996 report the Trustees confirmed again a proposition that
is becoming increasingly familiar to Americans-rather than being in
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close actuarial balance for a 75-year period, the old age, sUlvivors, and
disability trusts funds are in close actuarial balance for only 35 years,
under an intermediate set of assumptions regarding births, deaths, labor
force participation, real interest rates, and real wage growth. Under
these assumptions, the trust funds are accumulating assets now, that is,
they are running a current account surplus, but the assets rapidly deplete
and the net worth of the trust funds drops to zero by about year 2030. By
this time fund outflows are expected to be running well ahead of inflows,
so major changes would have to be made to bring the system back into
close actuarial balance for a 75-year period. Even more significant
changes would be necessary to bring the system into close actuarial balance in perpetuity. This chapter reviews briefly what some of these
changes might be.

Incremental Change Options
Logically, any incremental change options must be either on the benefits
side or the tax side. I first discuss some benefit and tax changes within
the present system and then some more radical options for changing
the system.

Raising the Retirement Age
The measure that first occurs to most people is to raise the normal retirement age. When Social Security first began in the 1930s, the normal male
life expectancy at age 65 was 12 years. It is now 15 years and slated to rise
to 18 years over the forecast horizon. Given this rise, and the fact that
most workers are less likely to have had physically demanding work histories than in the 1930s, it might seem logical to raise the normal retirement age for payment of benefits above its present level of 65 years of
age (and slated to rise gradually toward 67 beginning in year 2000 due
to previous austerity reforms).
Although there are strong arguments for considering further rises in
the retirement age, there are also some drawbacks. For one thing, not all
workers now have easy jobs; some are still physically spent by age 65. For
another, rises in the normal retirement age may have different effects on
different racial groups, depending on their life expectancies. For a third,
the fact that life expectancy at retirement has increased does not necessarily mean that retiree health has; the three added years on a retiree's
life may be three years of relatively poor health for some individuals. But
the biggest problem with raising the normal retirement age is that, because of the way benefits are computed, in the end this is nothing but an
across-the-board cut in Social Security retirement benefits. Given the
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generally low level of these benefits already, and the fact that this low
level already leaves many aged individuals in poverty status, there may be
a better rationale for selective, not general, cuts in benefits.
Other Cuts in Benefits
There are many other ways of cutting benefits, as compared to present
law. An across-the-board measure often suggested by legislators hoping
for quick cuts in budget deficits is to delay or suspend the price indexing
of benefits. One problem here is that the fact that a key value of Social
Security lies in its protection against inflation. Suspension of price indexing, for any group of people or any time period, debases this value. Another problem, as already noted, is that for many people Social Security
benefits are not very high, and even brief suspensions of indexing will
throw many aged people into poverty status.
An approach suggested in the deficit-reduction plan of a group known
as the Concord Coalition is to means-test current benefits (i.e., reduce
benefits for high income retirees). While there eventually may be a need
to scale back benefits for high income people, there are other ways of
doing this that seem much more consistent with the underlying logic of
Social Security than simple means-testing. One is to alter the benefi t formula gradually over time so that high income replacement rates are
lower. Another is to make benefits completely taxable within the general
income tax, using either consumption or income tax principles.
There might also be a mixed strategy for scaling back benefits. One
such package might consist of more complete taxation of all Social Security benefits, further increases in the retirement age, and further
gradual reductions in high income replacement rates through the benefit formula.
Raising Payroll Taxes
The great unmentionable in American politics is the T word-should
there be rises in taxes? Tax increases could be designed that would restore the close actuarial balance of the system, and they could be nicely
delayed for ten or twenty years so as not to cause grief to present-day
politicians. Should they be part of the actuarial balance rescue package?
One objection to the present payroll tax is that for high incomes the
tax is regressive. It is assessed only on the first US $61,000 of annual
wages, at the 87th percentile of the wage distribution. This regressivity
could be partially corrected by simply removing the taxable ceiling, as
has already been done for the health insurance component of the payroll tax. While this change would reduce the regressivity of the payroll
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tax, it would not eliminate all regressivity because much of the income
of high income people does not come in wage form, a change that would
bring in limited net revenue over the very long run unless the benefit
schedule were flattened at the high end.
The other possibility is simply to raise the payroll tax rate. Adverse
affects on economic competitiveness are probably modest due to the presumed inelasticity of overall labor supply and the fact that general payroll
taxes are probably shifted back onto labor. But the real problem with
this type of change, and also with all of the benefit reductions discussed
above, involves an issue not yet raised that is likely to become increasingly important over time-rates of retlim.
By comparing payroll employer and employee taxes and subsequent
benefits, it is possible to compute internal rates of return for different
age cohorts from the Social Security system. For cohorts born in 1875,
who paid in next to nothing and received benefits, annual real rates of
return were on the order of 35 percent, better than almost any imaginable investment. For cohorts born in 1900, annual real rates of return
were about 10 percent, and for cohorts born in 1925, abollt5 percent,
still well above the going real interest rate in the economy (approximately 3 percent). For cohorts born in 1950, roughly the beginning of
the baby boom generation, rates of return are down to 2 percent, now
below the going real interest rate, and they continue to drop slowly.
These are real rates of return for the whole cohort. But as was pointed
out above, because of the progressivity of the Social Security system, rich
people of a cohort get a lower internal rate of return than the cohort as
a whole (with constant life expectancies). For these relatively well-Qff
young people, the internal rate of return is on the order of 1 percent
or lower.
There are basically three reasons for this drop in rates of return. First,
any PAYG system will experience rate of return drops as the system matures; those retired at the time the system starts get benefits without
paying in and get infinite rates of return. Rates of return then drop
asymptotically toward the rate of growth of real wages plus population
growth, the equilibrium real rate of return in a PAYG system (Samuelson 1958). That suggests the other two reasons for the drop in rates
of return. The second is that, because of the drop in national saving
and other economic factors, overall productivity growth and the rate of
growth of real wages has slowed in the United States. This rate of growth
of real wages is projected to be only 1 percent per year, and even that low
rate is above that experienced for the past two decades. The third reason
is demographics. For the first time since the US Social Security system
began, a cohort (the baby boom generation) was larger than the following cohort. But by now fertility rates are low enough that every cohort is
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predicted to be larger than its following cohort, at least apart from new
immigration. Thus there are always likely to be relatively few workers
paying the retirement costs of relatively more workers, or, in Sarnuelsonian terms, the equilibrium real rate of return on workers' Social Security
contributions will be I percent or less.
Until now Social Security has been a uniquely popular public program. Poll after poll has recorded this popularity, and an important
reason to maintain the generality of Social Security is to preserve its
popularity. It is one public system that everybody is a part of, and the
sheer accomplishment of paying out this much in benefits for this long
a time should not be denigrated. But looked at in cold, calculating terms,
any program that gives people IO percent real rates of return should .
be pretty popular. What happens when the real rate of return drops to
I percent or below, as it is bound to with further payroll tax increases or
benefit cuts? Friedland (1994) already reports that young people seem
to have much less interest in Social Security than their elders, commonly reporting that "there will be nothing there for me." There may
be something there for young people, but if the internal rate of return is
less than 1 percent, these same people can be excused for asking "just
how much?"
This political popularity point, much more than economic distortions,
seems to be the main argument against tax increases. They load costs
even more on young people, who are already getting a low implicit rate
of return on their tax payments. It is also a reason for going slow on
reductions in benefits to high income individuals, which raise the same
rate of return questions. But if tax increases and high income benefit
cuts are ruled out for political reasons, how exactly does the nation restore actuarial balance in the system? There are not many obvious alternatives other than altering the way funds for retirement income are
saved and invested.

Fundamental Changes
One possible answer to the question of how to make austerity cuts but
still keep well-off young people feeling they have a stake in Social Security is to give these young people new pension saving opportunities, either collectively or individually. Macroeconomists generally agree that
the United States economy is now undersaving. Were there added pension saving, it could be invested at the world real interest rate of about
3 percent. While one could not fight the fact that well-off young people
received only 1 percen t real return on their Social Security payroll taxes,
these same young people could do much better on their whole retirement portfolio.
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In addition to this macroeconomic rationale, there is also a microeconomic rationale for such a change. There aloe grounds for believing
that the present US tax and retirement system unduly limits private pension saving. It is now possible to do some pension saving in the US tax
code under consumption tax treatment, but there are tight limits on
these possibilities. Recent income tax law changes have also discouraged
pension saving in defined benefits plans (Committee for Economic Development 1995). Overall, it is estimated that the typical worker would
need to save 18 percent of wages annually to provide for 50 percent replacement of income in retirement years (Schieber 1995; Cutler 1995).
The typical worker in the United States now saves at rates well below
18 percent, even when including the 10.7 percent (12.4 percent including disability) of wages now paid in the form of Social Security retirement taxes.
There are two ways of capturing the gains from added national saving,
one primarily a public or collective approach and one primarily a private
or individual approach.

Higher Public Pension Saving
The most straightforward public way to raise national saving was proposed by Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless (ABB 1989). They argue for prefunding the rise in future benefit payments by raising payroll taxes now
and investing the proceeds in government bonds, as the system now
does. A more radical variant of this approach was recently suggested by
one of the ABB team, Bosworth (1995). Under his new approach, payroll
taxes would again be raised now, though by less than in the ABB proposal, but instead of investing the funds in government bonds, Bosworth
would permit the Social Security trust fund to invest a portion of its assets
in private equities, hence permitting the system to capture more of the
benefits of the high rates of return on new saving. This approach would
enable the Social Security system to take advantage of what economists
call the "equity premium puzzle," the fact that over long periods of time
equities pay substantially more than bonds, even with generous adjustments for portfolio risk (Congressional Budget Office 1994). Bosworth
calculates that under realistic assumptions these changes alone would
eliminate actuarial deficits for the foreseeable future, with only a 2 percentage point rise in payroll tax rates (from the present 12.4 percent to
14.4 percent)
Under either the ABB or the new Bosworth approach, it may be necessary to remove Social Security from the federal budget. As long as Social Security stays in the budget and deficit targets are imposed on the
overall unified budget, it can almost be guaranteed that any added Social
0
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Security saving will be offset by higher deficits elsewhere in the budget.
This means that any added Social Security saving will not even raise federal government saving, let alone overall national saving, and that there
\vill be no added national income to be used to solve the long-term difficulties of the Social Security system.
Under the new Bosworth approach it would also be important to regulate the investments of the new Social Security fund. One obvious reason
is financial prudence; but there is another reason as well. Right now the
Social Security fund is more than ten times as large as any other pension
fund in the United States, and the disparity increases if Social Security
payroll tax rates rise further. Given the size of this new pool of investment funds, and the possibility of it being used in a political way, it would
be very important to neutralize the political impact of Social Security
investment. There may be ways to do this, either by letting a number of
competing fund managers do the investment or by having Social Security
invest in broadly based index funds (Weaver I994b), although this presents a formidable and perhaps unprecedented problem in financial
politics.

Higher Private Pension Saving
The private approach features a variant of the dual pillar system that the
World Bank, among others, has been advocating (World Bank 1994;
Weaver 1994a). In a gradualist version of the dual pillar approach, future
Social Security benefits for young, high income people might be scaled
back, and then supplemented by mandatory defined contribution individual accounts layered on top of the Social Security system.
These individual accounts could be held inside or outside Social Security, with the individuals who own them given constrained choices
about investing the accounts in index stock funds or index bond funds.
Again overall pension saving is supplemented by new national saving,
again invested at the going market rate of return for stocks or bonds.
This time, since the investment is through the individual accounts, there
would be no particular fear of government political control of large investment funds. Particular individuals or firms would choose their own
funds managers, and these management decisions would be sufficiently
diversified to eliminate most political control problems.
But there could be some other fears. One is the need to insure the
safety of these individual accounts, both in terms of how the funds were
invested and how the annuities were regulated. Another is the fear that,
as high income people rely more and more on their individual accounts
and less and less on Social Security proper, Social Security becomes more
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of a redistribution program and less of a communitarian program. This
too could threaten the unique political popularity of the Social Security
system.
It is also possible, however, to imagine an intermediate reform that still
raises national saving, along the lines recently proposed by the Bipartisan
Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform (1995). Instead of simply
raising payroll tax rates, it might be possible to designate some of these
added contributions as made on behalf of the individual, and to fold
these contributions into the normal Social Security indexed annuity that
is now payable on retirement. The investment of these individual accounts could be done by constraining choices to broad investment options, as the federal thrift plan now does. This intermediate option raises
national saving without raising taxes and solves the investment difficulties associated with direct-fund investment in equities. Whether it sets to
rest fears that the individualized component will dominate the public
component of Social Security over time is quite difficult to determine. A
different form of intermediate measure is to make the individualized accounts voluntary, perhaps related to or constrained by the amount of
benefit cuts certain individuals received.
However these issues play out, the underlying feature of all of these
options is that there must be added national saving. This saving can be
invested at attractive rates of return, and these returns can be used to
raise overall national living standards and simultaneously to supplement
pension income and ward off the looming financial difficulties amply
documented in the Trustees' Report. This saving could be done collectively by the Social Security system, individually, or individually within the
Social Security system. There are advantages and disadvantages of each
approach, but the national saving does have to be added. Without this,
society's l.iving standards are no higher, and any greater returns from
equity investment are only a form of higher Social Security tax on the
rest of the economy (Congressional Budget Office 1994).

Implications
The US Social Security system has served remarkably well for a 50-year period in providing retirement income for hundreds of millions of people
and in maintaining a high degree of political popularity. It should not
be changed quickly or without careful planning. At the same time, some
of the early assumptions on which the system was built are now changing: retirees are living longer, cohort sizes are stable or declining, and,
most significantly, rates of national saving and productivity growth have
dropped sharply. All of these changes are leading to drops in the internal
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rate of return on Social Security contributions to levels well below going
real interest rates. The combination of these changes and other forces
has led to a considerable reduction in the long-term actuarial health of
the system, requiring some package of significant cuts in benefits and/
or payroll tax increases.
These cuts or increases may be difficult to accomplish in a way that
preserves the historical popularity of the Social Security system. There
might be several ways of breaking the impasse, from fine-tuning the present system to new approaches for saving and investing retirement funds.
All approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, but it is generally true that the greater the level of new saving and the greater the
ability of the system to invest safely in equities, the less are austerity cuts
in benefits necessary and the higher are the overall rates of return on
pension saving for younger people.
Opinions are the author's and should not be attributed either to the
Advisory Panel or the Social Security Administration.
References

Aaron, Henry J, Barry P. Bosworth, and Gary Bunless. Can America Afford to Grow
Old: Payingfor Social Security. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989.
Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform. Final Report to the
President. Washington, DC: USPGO, 1995.
Bosworth, Barry P. "Fund Accumulation: How Much? How Managed?" in
Peter A. Diamond, David C. Lindeman, and Howard Young (eds.), Social Security: What Role for the Future? National Academy of Social Insurance, Washington, DC 1996.
Committee for Economic Development. Who Will Pay for Your Retirement? The
Looming Crisis. Committee for Economic Development, New York, NY, 1995.
Congressional Budget Office. Implications ofRevising Social Security's Investment Policies. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994.
Cutler, David M. "Reexamining the Three-Legged Stool" in Peter A. Diamond,
David C. Lindeman, and Howard Young (eds.), Social Security: l¥hat Role for the
Future? National Academy of Social Insurance, Washington, DC 1996.
Friedland, Robert D. l¥hen Support and Conjiden(£ Are at Odds: The Public's Understanding of the Social SeClLrity Program. Washington, DC: 'ational Academy of
Social Insurance, 1994.
Samuelson, Paul A. "An Exact Consumption Loan Model ofInterest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money." Journal of Political Economy (December
1958): 219-34.
Schieber, Sylvester J Retirement Income Adequacy at Risk: Baby Boomers' Prospects in the New Millennium. Watson Wyatt Worldwide working paper. Washington, DC: The Wyatt Company, 1995.
Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees. Status of the Social Security and
Medicare Progrmns. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996.

Edward M. Gramlich

229

Weaver, Carolyn L. The Current Status and Future Prospects of Social Security:
An Alternative View. The American Enterprise Institute mimeo, 1994a.
- - - . Social Security Investment Policy: What is it and How can it be Improved?
The American Enterprise Institute mimeo, 1994b.
World Bank. Averting the OUi Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Pro11Wte Growth.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

